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PlaintilIs also complain that lithe closing
of Vaughn Street requires trucks servicing
the property of plaintiffs, and other industdes along Vaughn Street, to use Bradley
Avenue, to Paxton Street; said Bradley
Avenue is a narrow, residential street and
the ·use of the same by heavy trucks is dan~
gCTOUS and adverse to the best interests of
the public using the-' same; if said Vaughn
Street crossing is permitted to remain obstructed and dosed, the 'access to the property of said plaintiffs by fire, police and
other public services, in the event of emergencies, will be greatly' impaired and delayed,"
[13,14] The first of these contentions
relat,es to matters already considered fully
by the Public _Utilities Commission (In re
G. C. Breidert, Decision ,No. 61775, supra,
58 Cal.P.U.C. 624 (unreported)), and in any
event injury to the public does not establish
a compensable loss to a private landowner
unless he is thereby specially injured. (E.g.,
Eachus v. Los Angeles etc. Ry., supra, 103
Cal. 614, 37 P. 750.) Tho. second contention
refers to' matters too speculative to produce
a compensable 10ss.8 (See "Rose v. State of
California, supra, 19 Cal.2d 713, 738. 123 P.
2d 50S.)

At a time when the tremendous growth of
population ,of this state compels rerouting
and rearrangement of streets and highways,
the claimed damages to property owners
from loss of access to the next intersecting
street and to the general system of streets
must be more than formal. It must be a true
loss; it must be substantial. entirely destroyed and yet n9t diminish
the actual value of the property for its
1lighest and best usc." (See HoUowny v.
Pureell (1950) 3,'l CaI.2d 220. 230. 217
P.2d 005; People v. Sayig (1951) 101
Cal.App.2d 890. 226 P.2d 702; City of
Los Angeles v. Geiger (1949) 94 CaL
App.2d 180. 191. 210 P.2d 717; Wolff
v. City of Los Angeles (1920) 49 Cal.
App. 400. 402. 193 P. 862; Oakland v.
Pacific Coast Lumber etc. Co. (1915)
171 Cal. 392, 399, 153 P. 705.)
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The judgments are reversed with instruetions to overrule the general demurrers and
to permit the parties to proceed in a manner
consistent with this opinion.
GIBSON, C. J., and SCHAUER, McCOMB, PETERS and PEEK, JJ., concur.
TRAYNOR, Justice (concurring).
Although I adhere to the views set forth
in my dissenting opinion in Bacich v. Board
of Control, 23 Cal.2d 343, 366-380, 144 P.2d
818, that case is the law of this state until it
is overruled. I therefore concur in the
judgment herein under the compulsion of
the Bacich case.
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Ronald J. VALENTA.t al., Plalntl1ra
and Appellants,
Y.

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES .t aI.,
Defendants and Respondents.

L. A. 27655.
Supreme Court of California.

In Bank.

Aug. 20. 19M.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 18. 1964.

Action for damage to plaintiffs' property resulting from the closing of access to
a highway. The Superior Court, Los Angeles County, Macklin Fleming and Leon T.
David, JJ., sustained defendants' general
8. "Plnintiffs also claim damages for the
taking of an easement over the Vaughn
Street crossing and _for maintenance of
n nuisnnce. PlaintUfs have no property
right in the public crossings (see City
of San Mateo v. Railroad Com. (1937) 9
Ca1.2d 1. 68 P.2d 713) and plaintiJfs
state no calise of action for mnintennnce
Q~ a nuisance unless they show that they
have been specially injured (see Bigley
v. Nunan (1879) 53 C~"t1. 403).

~---------------.~-----------,-'--------------
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demurrer to plaintiffs' amended complaint,
and entered judgments of dismissal, and
plaintiffs appealed. .The Supreme Court,
T obriner, J.r held that plaintiffs were not
entitled to damages for the taking of their
right of access to a highway even if it
resulted in their property having- been
placed on a cul-de-sac, in absence of a
showing of a substantial impairment of
access to the general system of public
streets or highways, but. under the circumstances, plaintiffs were entitled to a further
opportunity to amend their complaint if they
could do so, to state a cause of action for
substantial impairment of access,
Judgments reversed.

Opinion, 34 Cal.Rptr. 155, vacated.

I. Highways e=>B5

Owners of land in an unincorporated
area possessed the same right of access to
public streets and highways as those of

urhan landowners.
2. Eminent Domain ¢;:)85

Plaintiffs were not entitled to damages
for the taking of their right of ,access to a
highway even if it resulted in their property having been placed on a cul-de-sac, in
absence of a showing of a substantial impairment of access to the general system of
public streets or highways.
3. Eminent Domain ¢::::3106

In order for an abutting owner to state
a cause of action for damage to his property through loss of access to public streets
or public highways he must make a showing of substantial impairment of access, and
a bare showing that property has been
placed on a cul-de-sac is not sufficient.

Anson, Gleaves & Larson and Milnor E.
Gleaves, Los Angeles, for plaintiffs and
appellants.
Harold E. Kennedy, County Counsel,
Lloyd S. Davis, Deputy County Counsel,
E. D. Yeomans, Walt A. Steiger and James

w. Obrien, Los Angeles, for defendants
and respondents.
TOBRINER, Justice.
This case involves a claim of inverse
condemnation for damages to plaintiffs'
property resulting from a cul-de-sac. AI·
though plaintiffs' property lies in an unincorporated, rather than incorporated, area,
we explain why we have concluded that the
principle of substantial impairment of ac·
cess, as expressed in Breidert v. Southern
Pac. Co. (1964), 39 Cal.Rptr. 903, 394 P.2d
719, which there applies to an incorporated
area, is equally applicable here.
Plaintiffs are the owners of one-half of
a quarter section of land in the small rural
community of Vincent, an unincorporated
area of Los Angeles County. Plaintiffs'
property is bordered on the west by Sierra
Highway and on the east by the right-ofway of the Southern Pacific Ranroad~
Sierra Highway and the railroad right-ofway run in a general northerly-southerly
direction and are approximately 600 feet
apart. Angeles Forest Highway, a county
road, has its westerly terminus at Sierra
Highway in the Town of Vincent, where it
intersects, but does not cross, Sierra Highway. From here Angeles Forest runs in a
southeast direction, through -plaintiffs' land
and across the railroad right-of-way, to
Angeles Crest Highway, -the most direct
route from Vincent to the general system
of public streets in, the Pasadena-Los Angeles area. The record does not disclose the
use to which plaintiffs have put their land.
In 1959 the county board of supervisors
entered into an agreement with the defendant railroad for the construction of a
grade crossing some distance from the
existing crossing at Angeles Forest Highway and for the closing of the Angeles
Forest crossing. In the same year the
Public Utilities Commission approved the
closing, and in 1961 defendants permanently
closed the crossing by placing barricades
along both sides of the railroad right-of-way
at Angeles Forest Highway.
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Plaintiffs allege that the dosing has destroyed all access from their property over
Angeles Forest Highway, and that the

closing has placed plaintiffs' property in a
cuI-de-sac. In the present action' plaintiffs
claim damages in inverse condemnation
for the taking or damaging of their right of
access in Angeles Forest Highway. Plain-

tiffs' claim is based upon Article I, section
14 of the California Constitution, provid-

ing that "[pJrivate property shall not be
taken or damaged for public use without
just compensation.

* * *"

The trial

court sustained defendants' general demurrer to plaintiffs' amended 'complaint j it
entered judgments of dismissal as to both
defendants.

Plaintiffs appeal these judg-

ments.
Thus w~ deal with claimed damage resulting from the creation of a cuI-dc-sac;
the principle expressed in Breidert v. Southern Pac. Co. (1964). 39 Cal.Rptr. 903, 394
P.2d 719, as to such a situation must apply.
Although defendants argue that "the cul-desac rule cannot properly be applied to a
rural highway," any distinction between unincorporated rural areas and incorporated
city areas would be purely formal.
[1] To grant recovery to owners of
property in an incorporated area and to
deny it to those in an unincorporated area
would _be to draw an indefensible division.
No reasonable or functional line distinguishes such property holdef:'s. The unincorporated area often becomes the incorporated area; the sprawling growth of
city and subdivision necessarily blurs any
such classification. Indeed, the cases recognize that the owners of land in unincorporated areas possess property rights identical to those of urban landowners. (See
People ex rei. Dept. of Public Works v.
Lipari (1963) 213 Cal.App.2d 485, 489. 28
CaI.Rptr.808; Leverone v. Weakley (1909)
155 Cal. 395, 402, 101 P.304; AnderSon v.
State of California (1943) 61 Cal.App2d
140, 141. 143, 142 P.2d 88; see also Rose v.
State of California (1942) 19 Cal2d 713.
730, 123 P.2d 505.)

In Tift County v. Smith (Ga.App.I962)
107 Ga.App. 140, 129 S.E.2d 172 (reversed
on other grounds (Ga.I963) 219 Ga. 68, 131
S.E.2d 527). the Georgia Court of Appeals
held, on facts substantially identical to those
of the instant case. that rural property
owners had the "same rights in abutting
streets as did city propcrty owners, and that
plaintiff was entitled to compensation for
loss of access. The court stated that
U[t]he defendant seeks to draw a distinction between rural property and urban property when, while the value per front foot
may vary, there is no distinction between
the rights of the owners of such property.
The provisions of the Constitution that
the protection of person and property shall
he impartial and complete [citations], and
that private property shall not be taken or
damaged without just compensation being
first paid [citations], do not allow one ru~.e
for urban property owners and another for
the owners of rural property." (Id. at p.
174:)
Defendants rely upon dicta in two older
cases which we disapprove. In Levee Dist.
No.9 v. Farmer (1894) 101 Cal. 178, 35,P.
569. and Swift v. Board of Suprs. (1911)
16 Cal.App. 72, 116 P. 317, the respective
plaintiffs unsuccessfully sought injunctive
relief against county boards in order to
prevent proposed abandonment. of county
roads. Holding that the involved board
possessed the power to order such abandonment, each of these courts included in
its opinion dicta to the effect that an
abutting owner cannot recover damages for
loss of access to a county, as distinguished
from. a city thoroughfare. Metzger v. Bose
(1960) 183 CatApp.2d 13, 6 Cal.Rptr. 337,
relies upon the same proposition. As we
have stated, we do 'not agree, and to that
ext~ :we disapprove of those -cases.
:i'l ,;':.
~2i The test, established in Breider!, as
appF~a:ble here, requires that we determine
whether plaintiffs have alleged a substantial impairment of access to the general

,
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system pf public streets or highways. Although in Breidert we were concerned
solely with an incorporated urban area and
thus held plaintiffs' right of access ran to
the general system of public streets, we arc
here involved with an unincorporated area
and therefore hold plaintiffs' right of access
extends to both the general system of public
streets and public highways.

[3] Plaintiffs' first amended complaint,
under this test, does not sufficiently allege
the necessary showing. As we noted in
Breidert the decisions have explained that
the court must determine whether the property owner has made a showing of substantial impairment of access; the bare allegation of a cuI-dc-sac does not suffice. Plain-

tiffs here have failed to specify the use to
which plaintiffs have put their property; the
added distance, if any, which they must
travel in order to reach the general system
of public streets or public highways; the
lack of availability of reasonat:c alternative
routes to such general system of public
streets or public highways; or, indeed,
whether the closing has substantially im·
paired plaintiffs' right of access to such
public streets or public highways.
In light of our ruling in Breidert, we
believe, however, that plaintiffs should be
granted a further opportunity to amend
their complaint, if they can do so, to state a
caUSe of action for such substantial impairment of access.
The judgments are reversed.
GIBSON, C. J., and SCHAUER, McCOMB, PETERS and PEEK, JJ., concur.
TRAYNOR, Justice (concurring).
Although I adhere to the views set forth
in my dissenting opinion in Bacich v.
Board of Control, 23 Cal.2d 343, 366-380,
144 P2d 818, that case is the law of this
state until it is overruled. I therefore
concur in the judgment herein under the
compulsion of the Bacich case.

39 CalRptr. 012

In r. Arthur Chari •• GRADY
on Habeas Corpus.
Cr. 7816.
Supreme Court of California,
In Bank.
Aug. 24. 1964.

Petitioner, who was confined in the
California Men's Colony at Los Padres
after being convicted in the Superior Court,
Riverside County, Merrill Brown, J., of un·
lawful possession of peyote, brought a habeas corpus proceeding. The Supreme Court,
Tobriner, J., held that it is a defense to a
prosecution for unlawful possession of
peyote that the peyote was being used in
connection with the bona fide practice of a
religious belief.
Writ granted, and petitioner remanded
for trial.

Poisons ~
It is defense to prosecution for possession of peyote that peyote was being used in
connection with bona fide practice of religious belief. West's Ann.Health & Safety
Code, § 11500.

Arthur Charles Grady, in pro. per., and
Rufus W. Johnson, Anaheim, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for ·peti·
tioner.
Mitchel J. Exer, Beverly Hi!ls, A. L.
Wirin and Fred Okrand, Los Angeles,
amici curiae on behalf of petitioner.
Stanley Mosk, Atty. Gen.) William E.
James, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Jack K.
Weber, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondent.
TOBRINER Justice.
Petitioner, now confined in the California
Men's Colony at Los Padres after conviction for unlawful possession of narcotics in
violation of Health and Safety Code section
11500, presents in this in propria persona

